Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

J. M. Webb v. Margaret Webb : Reply Brief of
Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Jensen & Jensen; Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants;
Cline Wilson & Cline; Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Webb v. Webb, No. 7208 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/930

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7.208

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J. M. vVEBB, and
SPENCER \\'EBB,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

MARGARET WEBB and
MARGARET WEBB AS
.\DMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF
WILMER WEBB, Deceased.
Defendants and .\ ppellants.

No. 7,208

I LED
FEB .! ! 19~g

--~SUPiiiai£-i:OURT;ur;;-
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Appeal fron1 the District Court, l\lillard County, Utah
Honorable \Vill L. Hoyt. Judge

JENSEN & JENSE?\
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants

CLINE. WILSON & CLINE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONTENTS·
Page
On Right To Trial by Jury
1-7
Sufficiencv of the Evidence - - - - - - - - - - - 7-13
13-16
Incompetent and Hearsay Conservations
16-10
Reply to "Miscellaneous" Argument
Administratrix's Right to An Accounting
2-24
Conclusions
24

INDEX TO AUTHORITIES
Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West
55 U. 357; 186 P. 114 - - - - - - - - 3
Corp. of Latter Day Saints v Watson
25 U. 45; 69 P. 531 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 14, 18
Emerson-Grantingham Implement Co. v. Giles et al
59 U. 54; 202 P. 543
3
Ezzell v. Endsley, 169 P. 2d 309 (Okl)
4
4
Gibson v. McGurrin et al, 37 U 158; 106 P. 669
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Ct. of Carbon Co.
et al·, 48 U. 342; 159 P. 737
6
Nieimeier v. Rosenbaum, 63 P. 2d 424
4
Osage Oil & Refining Co. v. McDowell et al,
220 P. 609 (Okl)
4
Norbach v. Board of Ed. of Ch. Exten.
84 U. 506; 37 P 2d. 339
2
Park v. \:Vilkinson, 21 U. 279; 60 P. 945
5, 6
Parsons v. Cashman et al, 137 P. 1109 (Cal)
18
Petty v. Clark, 102 U. 186; 129 P. 2d. 568
5
18
Rogers v. Scott et al, 151 P. 379
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 U. 150; 193 P. 1093
15
Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 U. 582; 5 P. 2d. 570
20
State Building and Loan Ass 'n v. Perkins et al
54 U. 474; 173 P. 950
5
Thompson v. Anderson, 107 U. 331; 153 P. 2d 665 _ _
3
Thompson v. Brown Livestock Co. et al
74 U. 1; 276 P. 651 - - - - - - - - 2, 6
STATUTES AND DIGESTS
2
U. C. A. '43, 104-23-5 - - - - - - - - - - U. C. A. '43, 104-23-6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3
15
U. C. A. '43, 104-49-2 - - - - - - - - - - 15
5 Am. Jur. sec. 29 p. 3 7 9 - - - - - - - - - - 15
21 A. L. R. 928 - - - - - - - - - - - - 19
101 A. L. R. 1097-1106 - - - - - - - - - = - - - 16
70 c. J. p. 348 - Utah
Bar
Bul·letin,
July-Aug.
'41,
Justice
Wolfe
_and
_Library Services
15
Sponsored
by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
provided
by the Institute
of Museum
and Technology
by the356
Utah State
Jones onLibrary
Evi.Services
Civil
Cases, Act,
4thadministered
ed. sec.
p. Library.
659 _ _
15
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
J.

M. WEBB, and
SPENCER WEBB,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
MARGARET WEBB and
MARGARET WEBB AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF
THE ESTATE OF
WILMER WEBB, Deceased.

No. 7,208

Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF

ON RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
Herein "A. br." refers to appellants' brief, and "R. br."
refers to respondents' brief.
Among other things, the court in settling the bill of exceptions herein made the following findings :
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"4. That the issues herein were first joined on July 10,
1947.
"5·. That on July 14th, 1947, the clerk of this court
received from counsel for the defendant a check for
five dollars as a jury fee, and which letter contained the
following request for a jury, to-wit:
'We respectfully request you and the court to
have the above case set on the jury calendar
and that the setting be sometime after September 2nd, 1947.' " (R. 356).
On July 15, 1947, in open court and in absence of counsel
for the defendants, said request for a jury trial was denied.
Prior to this time, both the court and counsel for the plaintiffs had been advised that we were unable to leave the trial of
another case to try this case during June or July, 1946.
Respondents concede in their brief that the issues tendered by their complaint and joined thereon by the defendants' answers, are legal issues. The -issues joind by plaintiffs'
reply to the administratrix's second cause of action, are also
legal issues. (R. 24, 28; A. br 8-9). Whether there was any
contract between Wilmer Webb and his brothers for his
support and maintenance, and whether there was any consideration for such a claimed contract, may well be a legal
issue for a jury, Thompson v. Brown Livestock Co., et al,
74 U. 1 at p. 21-22; 276 P. 651.
''In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal
property, with or without damages,
an isstie of fact
may be tried by a jury, unl;ess waived
U. C. A. '43, 104-23-5.

* *,
* * .''

'''We are of the opinion the instant case is an action at
law. Almo~t without exception, the· rule is· that actions
to try the title of real estate shall be tried to a jury."~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Did defendants waive a jury trial? Did the demand for
a jury trial come too late Y This court has held that where
the demand for a jury trial was first made on the date the
case was call'ed for trial, it came too Ia te, "there being no
jury upon attendance," of the court, Emerson-Grantingham
Implement Co. v. Giles et al, 59 U. 54; 202 P. 543. Similar is
the case of Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. West,
55 U. 357; 186 P. 114, where the request for a jury was made
seven days before the date the case was called for trial and.
more than two and one half-months after the case was set
and awaiting trial.
The rule of court in the Third District Court to carry out
the statute of the reasonable time in which to "notice the
motion" to have the case changed from a non-jury setting
to a jury setting is "five days before the date of trial" as
reported in Thompson v. Anderson, 107 U. 331 at p. 335;
153 P. (2d) 665.
Now, September 2, 1947, was the opening day of the
fall term in the District Court of Millard County, Utah. In
this district, terms have been set for the convenience of
jurors, and the presumptions of difficulty in getting a jury
at that time are not well taken.
At the time of the setting of this case for trial, which
was forty-eight days before the trial date, the court had before it our written request for a jury trial. All Section 10423-6 U. C. A. "43 provides is that the person desiring a jury
trial "must demand it, either by written notice to the clerk
prior to the time of setting such action for trial, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by respondents is to the same effect.
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Certain it is that this case was set for trial on the 15th
day of July . 1947, in our absence and for a non-jury trial.
At that time, a written demand had been made for a jury
trial, and the fee tendered. The court refused to permit the
clerk to accept the fee, and immediately ordered it returned.
An examination of the case of O,sage Oil & Refining Co
v. McDowell et al, 220 P. 609 (Okl), does not disclose when,
if at all, there was a demand for a jury trial. All that appear5
in the report of the case is: "that the parties in open court
waived a jury"; and that on account of illness of the
judge, the trial was continued from December 9th· to December 15th, when it was tried.
Likewise, the report of the case of Ezzell v. Endsley,
169 P. (2d) 309 (Okl), does not disclose when, if at all, there
was a demand for a jury trial. All the report of the case
discloses is that the court "correctly held Ezzell to a previous
stipulation to waive a jury." What the respondents quoted
is the syllabus, and that states when the case "was called
for trial" the parties waived a jury.
From an examination of the report of the case of Nie·
meier v. Rosenbaum, 63 P. (2d) 424 ('Wash)~ one cannot determine when the demand for a jury trial was made in relation
to the trial date. From examination of the report, it may
be that the demand was made on the date. of trial.
The above three cases are much the same as our own
case of Gibson v. McGurrin et al, 37 U. 158 at p. 167; 106 P.
669, wherein it states: "In this case, there is nothing to indicate that the respondent ever demanded a jury.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tendered by the affirmative defenses and counterclaims.
These were properly triable to the court.
We concede that the issues of whether the deed and bill
of sale were in truth and in fact a mortagage, are equitable
issues. We concede the issues are equitable as to whether
the deed and bill of sale in qustion should be set aside as to
Margaret Webb individually, and set aside as to the administratrix of the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased. On said
issues, the jury would have been advisory to the court, Utah
State Building and Loan Ass 'n. v. Perkins et al, 53 U. 474,
173 P. 950.
By what standard it can be determined which of these
issues are major and which minor, does not appear from the
cases. It does appear this court has held legal and equitable
issues in the same case are to be separately tried. To support
respondents' contention that the trial was proper in this
case, they quote from Justice Wolfe's concurrip.g opinion in
Petty v. Clark, 102 U. 186; 129 P. (2d) 568 at page 571.
wherein is given the supporting citation of Park v. Wilkinson,
21 U. 279; 60 P. 945. Upon examination of that case, we find
the second syllabus of the case is weU supported by the
decision. Said syllabus is :
~'Actions to quiet title or to determine adverse claims

under sec. 3511, R. S. 1898, may be of a legal or equitable
character, depending upon the pleadings; but where
there are both equitable issues and issues of fact in the
case, the court should first determine the equitable issue, and then submit the issues of fact to a jury upon
proper instructions, and a failure so to do constitutes
reversibl-e error.''
This decision has been followed in this jurisdiction:
"This court has also held that when in a case both
equitable and legal issues arise and it becomes necessary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
to determine the equitable issues before proceeding to
an adjustment of the legal rights of the parties, or some
of them in such event the court must determine the
equitable issues first. Park v. Wilkinson, 21 U. 285;
60 P. 945, and cases there cited."
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Dist. Ct. of Carbon County et al
48 U. 342 at p. 353; 159 P. 737.
This doctrine has not been repudiated or modified by our
court. About this doctrine our court later said:
"Further, it is a famil'iar rule that objections that a case
is not of legal, but of equitable, cognizance must be timely
interposed and at the threshold of the case. 3 C. ]. 756.
The decisions of this jurisdiction are in harmony with
that. Park v. Wilkinson 21 U. 279,

* * ."

Thompson et al v. Brown Livestock Co., et al, 74 U.
1, at p. 22; 276 P. 651.
At the outset of this case, we agreed there were equitable issues in this case which should be tried by the court,
but on those, asked the jury to be advisory. Our position
was, and is, there are substantial and material issues herein
which should be submitted to a jury. We maintained our
right to a jury trial and took our exception to proceeding
without the jury. Upon this matter, we submit that appellants did not mislead the court; but h the contrary, timely
and properly demanded the trial by jury. The court refus(·'1
to give appellants the right of such a trial.
In view of the statements of counsel for the respondents
that "appellants adopted a course of delays in pleading and
further delays in getting the case to trial" and that "In fact,
it would be tantamount to holding that litigants, by securing
one or more delays or continuances after a case is once set
trial,
could secure a jury trial by artifice and indirection when
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to state the facts which counsel for respondents knew about
the extensions of time.
Our client has had no business or property experience.
She was a widow without a home, property or income. From
the inception of this case, we negotiated for, and urged the
plaintiffs for, a compromise which would at least l·eave the
appellant herein a home in which to maintain herself and raise
her children. Progress \vas made upon these negotiations,
and it was not until the time of trial that they broke down.
In addition, counsel for the appellants during the spring and
summer of 1947, were involved in trying the case of Whittaker v. Spencers et al, now No. 7181 before this court, in
which eight attorneys were waiting upon the trial court.
Until the court released us from that trial, we could not try
this case.
\Ve have examined all cases cited by the respondents. We
find no case which holds that a demand for jury trial came
too late which was made at the setting (or reset) at least
forty-five days before the trial date. We find no case where
a court upon substntial legal issues refused to grant a jury
trial under similar factual situations. We submit on the
legal issues herein that defendants were, and are entitled to a jury trial.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
This appeal is made on the basis that the evidence clearly
preponderates against said findings. To limit the examination
of the testimony to that of Mr. Crafts and Mrs. Webb, is an
error into which respondents have fallen. To support such
Sponsored
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timony of Mr. Crafts and the plaintiffs. In addition to appellants' argument in her brief, we make the following reply
thereon:
Wilmer Webb's direction to the plaintiffs, by his letter
of March 8, 1946, written for him by his niece, was to "go to
the secretary or trunk and get the deed to the house and
bring up so he can mortgage it to set some money for his
hospital fee," (Ex. A. tr. 17). This is the representation which
Jack Webb made to Margaret Webb on the night of March
_9, 1946, when he presented said Exhibit "A' to her- that the
instrument to be prepared was a mortgage. There is nothing in all the writings of Wilmer Webb or the competent
testimony of what Wilmer Webb said to change that authority and direction. Can the respondents claim that letter was
authority for their taking and converting to themselves, each
and all Wilmer's savings bonds, the title certificate to h1s
car, and his water certificates? Can the transaction oi
March 14 to 18, 1946, inclusive, be sufficient evidence to support said finding that said property became that of the
plaintiffs? Plaintiffs fail to point out any evidence to support
such findings. We find no such evidence in the record to
support said claims.
The respondents assert there is substantial evidence to
support findings we attack. We call the court's attention to
the status of the pleadings and evidence upon the question
whether Margaret Webb intended to deed the home place
-vvhen she signed the purported deed, and whether she knew
it was not intended to be a mortgage, and that she was
fully informed as to the nature df the instrument, (Finding 8).
Paragraph
thefor administratrix's
counterclaim
al-Services
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Library.of
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digitization provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

leges:·

9
"That on and between the 21st day ofJuly, 1945, and the
4th day of July, 1946, the decedent, Wilmer E. Webh,
was the owner of and, together with the defendant herein as his wife, during said time was in possession of the
following described property in Millard County, Utah
to-wit:
".-\11 of Lots Three ( 3) and Four ( 4), Block Seventeen

( 17), Plat "A" Deseret Survey, being part of Section
Five (5), Township Eighteen (18) South, Range Seven
(7) \Vest, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
"That thereon was and is situated the home of said
Wilmer E. Webb and of Margaret Webb, his widow. That
at all times herein mentioned since the commencement
of the above entitled action, the defendant, Margaret
Webb, has been and now is in possession of said property
and claims the same as a widow's homestead under said
Wilmer E. Webb, deceased, for herself and said three
minor children." (R. 20-21; A. br. 5).
The reply of the plaintiffs thereto is as follows:
'"4. Admit the allegations of paragraph 3 of said counterclaim, but deny that the said defendant is entitled to
the possession of the property described in said para··
graph either as widow's homestead or otherwise." (R.
27; A. br. 11).
We have gone all through this case, and those pleadings
have stood as they are -

admitting that Wilmer Webb wa5

the owner of said real property, which is the home place, up
to and includilig the 4th day of July, 1946, which was the day
of his death. Can that admission be ignored? We say not.
It appears to us that said admission is strong evidence that
the purported deed in question is but a mortgage. For the
plaintiffs to have the purported deed from March 18, 1946,
to July 4, 1946, and admit they were not the owner of the
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therein is the owner thereof, seems to us in and of itself to
require a finding that upon the home, said purported deed i<;
a mortgage.
About the manner in which the property would be held
under the purported deed, Mrs. Webb testified Mr. Crafts
said:
~'

**

He said that turning - if we would sign this
property over to the brothers they would pay his hospital bills, then if such time came that he was able to
work again, all he would have to do would be to repay
the money they had spent and his property would be returned to him." (tr. 31, 66, 91).

That is the way Margaret Webb understood and intended the instrument to be.
The evidence shows she was inexperienced in business and
did not know anything about descriptions; that she askrd
her husband on March 18, 1946, whether he knew the home
place was in that purported deed; and he advised her he
didn't, but to not bother until he came home (tr. 39, 40,

53, 66).
Then, too, there was no change of possession of the
property after the execution of the purported deea; everything moved along just the same until after Wilmer's death.
There was no care and attention given under the claimed
agreement.
Another error of the respondents is that they base their
claim to a bona fide transaction with Mrs. Webb upon this
position: "Mr. Crafts then went to see Margaret Webb on
March
14th,
(R.digitization
br. 24).
visit
was and
onLibrary
the Services
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difference, with other evidence, takes from Mr. Craft's
testimony in many respects its accuracy.
Let it be observed that nowhere in the record is there
any evidence that there existed between Wilmer Webb and
Margaret Webb, husband and wife, any ground or cause for
divorce; that Mr. \Vebb has consulted Mr. Crafts concerning
his domestic difficulties; but that Mrs. Webb regarded
them as trivial, and would not sign any papers toward getting a divorce; that Mr. Crafts' announced views was these .
domestic problems were trivial, and the differences could have
been adjusted. Now, on the day before he went to see Mrs.
Webb about the claimed reconciliation, what did he do?
The hearsay, incompetent testimony, in part shows:that, ·on the day before Mr. Crafts first saw Margaret Webb,
he called the plaintiffs to his office. Just after lunch on
March 14, 1946, the plaintiffs came to his office (tr. 209).
Mr. Crafts then told the plaintiffs the condition of Wilmet·
was serious; that his spine had been disintegrating since h~
was taken ill; that two of the vertebra were seriously atfected and that the calcium was leaving the vertebra and
going into circulation; that he might live a number of months
or a number of years, but would be a helpless cripple the
rest of his life; and that it was probably Wilmer's desire to
transfer all of his property to them ( tr. 204, 209).
There is no doubt but what the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts
then knew Wilmer's illness would be fatal. The ddendant
pleaded in part: (from defendant, Margaret Webb's Answer
and Counterclaim):

**

"5.
that about February 1946, the plaintiffs were
informed and believed that the ailment of said Wilmer E.
Webb would be fatal and that he would not recover
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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known to defendant until the middle of June, 1946 when
the doctor for Wilmer E. Webb so advised defendant."
(R. 15); tr. 180-3).
.
The repiy of the plaintiffs thereto pl<:aded:
"5. Admit the allegations of paragraph 5 of the said
counterclaim excepting that plaintiffs deny the defendant
did not know the ailment of said Wilmer E. Webb would
be fatal until the middle of June, 1946, but all'ege upon
the contrary the defendant was aware of such fact as
quickly ~s these plaintiffs." (R. 30; tr. 180-3)
It was this afternoon of the 14th of March, 1946, as we
have pointed out in our brief (p. 44-5), that the plaintiff's,
with Mr. Crafts' cooperation, moved out to take over Wilmer's property. It was that afternoon when the partnership
fund was withdrawn and the check of $500.00 drawn to pay
Mrs. Webb (tr. SO; A. br. 44-5). It was in the conversations
on the afternoon of March 14, 1946, in the presence of Mr.
Crafts that the plaintiffs agreed between themslves they
were to get all of Wilmer's property (tr. 244).
On the next day, the 15th of March, 1946, when Mr.
Crafts first saw Mrs. Webb, he did not acquaint her with
the fatal nature of the iHness of her husband (tr. 31, 193-6).
He did not acquaint her wit4 the events of the day before in
which he participated; and he did not acquaint her with th~.:
status of the proper-ty of Wilmer Webb; and erroneously
advis~d her as to the urgent need of money._ Hm;</ever, it is
clear frQm the record that Mr. Crafts, claimed agent of
Wilmer Webb, and the plaintiffs, considered it imperative
to obtain from Mrs. Webb on March 15, 1946, a purported
divorce and property settlement before she could get inde.pendent
advice.
· Did
she
"accept"
$500.00?
d!d Services
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His advice was to do nothing with it until he came home
(tr. 39).
\Vilmer Webb took Mrs. Webb and her three children
into his home. He held them out to the world as his family.
Can it be then that for an offer of a mess of pottage-a one
thirty-fourth of the value of the estak ·- and without timely
advice, by concealment and misstatements, the plan to take
this property away from his widow and family, will be successful f To the contrary, it is well said that the whole world
owes a fiduciary duty to an inexperienced woman in regard
to business affairs. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case
of over-reaching, inadequate counseling, and active concealment of the husband's true condition and the status of his
property, than in this case. Upon the clear, convincing, preponderance of evidence, the court should have found that
the deed and bill of sale were what Wilmer Webb directed
them to be, and what the purported deed was represented t1)
be to Mrs. Webb - a mortgage to secure the money to pay
his doctor and hospital bills.

INCOMPETENT AND HEARSAY
CONVERSATIONS
Dudiey Crafts did not represent Margaret Webb, nor
claim to. Neither did Wilmer Webb represent her. Mr.
Crafts, a friend of Wilmer Webb and his attorney on domestic
relations problems, called unexpectedly on Mrs. Webb to
propose a divorce and property settlement. First, let us
treat the question as to hearsay conversations against Margaret Webb.
Both of the conversations between Wilmer Webb and
Dudley Crafts, lVIarch 10-13 and sometime after March 15,
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1946, at the Hospital in Salt Lake City, were outside of the
presence of Mrs. Webb. The same is true of the two conver~
sations between the plaintiffs and Mr5. Crafts in his office in
Delta on the 14th and 15th of March, 1946. With neither
Mrs. Webb· or anyone to represent her in these conversations,
they were heresay and inadmissible as to her, Corp. of Latter
Day Saints v. Watson, 25 U. 45 at p. 50; 69 P. 531. The respondents assert said conversations to be admissible because
]\1argaret Webb testified to part of her conversation of
March 18, 1946 with Wilmer Webb about the $500.00 check
and the purported deed. Plaintiffs objected to said testimony
of Margaret Webb on the ground that it was hearsay. We
did not resist that object as to Margaret Webb as an individual, but as to the administratrix claimed it was admissable.
~'he court admitted said conversation with the right of plaintiffs to move to strike. Plaintiffs did not move to strike.
We. maintain ~ur objections of heresay, were well taken. (See
our assignments Nos. 3, 3a, 3b, 3d, 4, 5, 6 and 7 - our brief
pages 66·72.)
On the grounds that said conservations were incompetent
as to Margaret Webb, individually, the preceding paragraph
is applicable. We submit the proposition to be sound, that
tih1ess Mr. Crafts was proved to be the agent or attorney
of Wilmer Webb to make the claimed agreement, purported
deed, and bill of sale, the conversations outside of the presen~e of Margaret Webb are also incompetent to her as
administrat,rix.
We timely made the objection that the plaintiffs could
not establish said agency by the declarations of the agent,
himself
tr. 189).
Our
objection
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overrulled.
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**

{;mployment by Wilmer \Vebb: ''
I woutdn 't hardly say
it was employment, I had been previously employed by him.
I was requested, as a friend of his by him, to do certain
things.'.' (Tr. 189).
"Doubtless, it is essential to the admission of the declarations of agent as part of the res gestae that the fact
of agency or authority be first proved. This fact cannot be proved by the declarations themselves, no matter
how publicly made, nor by declarations accompanied by
acts purporting to be performed in behalf of the principal, unless they are brought to the latter's knowledge."
Jones on Ev. Civil Cases, 4th ed. sec. 356, p. 659.
"In our opinion, it would be a dangerous precedent to
hold that the relationship of attorney and client in a
particular case can be established by the fact that such
relationship exists in some other case, even though the
subject matter of the two cases may bear some apparent
relation to each other,
Sandall v. Sandall, 57 U. 150 at 161; 193 P. 1093.
5 Am. J ur. sec. 29 p. 279

* *"

Defendants objected to the admissibility of said conversations under our statute U. C. A. '43 104-49-2,.. on the
ground said conversations were incompetent, and also that
the witness was incompetent to give over the objection of
the administratrix of Wilmer Webb's estate. The article of
Justice Wolfe in the Utah Bar Bulletin of July-August, 1941
points out: .
"Although the question has apparently not been decided
in Utah, there seems to be nothing in the statute which
prevents the agent of a surviving party from testifying
to the transaction with the deceased".
The citation of 21 A. L. R. 928 (1922) sustains this view.
In this case, however, the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts expressly testified Mr. Crafts was not the agent of the surviv-
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ing parties plaintiff, but claimed to be a friend of the decedent. Accordingly said rule is not applicable. We found no
case sustaining the view that the "claimed agent" of a deceased party can testify adversely to his estate. We submit the rule of incompetency under dead man statue, and on
other grounds heretofore argued should prevail ; particularly
in veiw of the situation that we have no way of checking
the accuracy of the claimed agent when alone with the
deceased. 70 C. J. page 348 N. 23, Whitaker v. Groover, Stubbs
& Company 54 Ga. 174.
The cases and argument of respondents about declarations against interest of a grantor, do not fit 'the evidence
in the case.
We submit the objections to the incompetency and heresay conservations were well taken, and should have been
sustained.

REPLY TO "MISCELLANEOUS" ARGUMENT
The respondents say this is not a case "involving the
right of a husband and wife, as between themselves, or one
where a husband has made a property settlement with the
wife or secured some most marfl agreement or make a settl-ement with the wife in anticipation of a divorce" (R. br.
37), We do not agree.
The testimony ·of Mr. Crafts regarding that contention
is in part : ''I asked her if she was willing to make a property
settlement and then go ahead and file suit for divorce, so
that he (Wilmer) would definitely know how much he had
_to bypay
her,
how
much
property
heprovided
had byleft.
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** "

ranged without any difficulty
True, she was willing,
if necessary, that aH of their property go to care for Wilmer,
even to the extent that she move out of the home so he
could get the income therefrom; but Wil'mer requested that
she remain therein.
Mrs. Webb, in part, testified of Mr. Crafts' conversation
with her on March 15, 1946: "They wanted me to get a
divorce, and wanted to know what I would take as settlement". (tr. 31). "He finally asked me how $500 would be as
a settlement." She didn't know what the $500 was to· be
for as she had refused to get a divorce ( tr. 32-3).
We submit the great preponderance of the evidence is
against the contention of the respondents that Mrs. Webb
refused to stay with her husband and take care of him. When
the question of care and maintenance of Wilmer W ~b~ aros~,
he was then in the hospital on his death bed; five doctors
were waiting upon him; he was needing blood transfusions;
and the plaintiffs and Mr. Crafts then knew the disease would
be fatal. It was but a play of words to talk of anything else
but keeping him in the hospital where he could be cared for,
until he could come home. A reference to:- letters of the
parties between themselvses, Exhibits "5 ",
"Y", "3 1 ',
"A", "E", "R"; the events of l\1arch 14,1946 in the office
of Mr. Crafts; to the manner of taking his bonds, water stock,
car certificate, and cash; the pittance of $53.14 which Mrs.
Webb received during January to July, 1946, inclusive out
of the estate and property; the "fencing off" of Mrs. Webb
·from March 8, 1946 on; and the fact of Mr. Crafts' speed and
urgency in getting Mrs. Webb's signature before she had
time to get independent advice:- will all compel the view that
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ings appealed from and against the argument of respondents
on said issues.
We disagree with the respondents upon the question of
the burden of proof of fair dealing in this case also:
''Where an old lady conveyed all her estate of $40,000
or more to her best friend, in considration of the latter's
agreement to support her during life, in the grantor's
suit as an incompetent to set aside the conveyance, the
burden of proof was on the grap.tee to show the absolute
good faith and unquestioned fairness of the transaction."
Rogers v Scott et al, 151 P. 379, syl. 1
To the same effect is the following:
"Deatings by a spiritual adviser with one who is without indebendent advice, and is about to die, and whose
mind is imvaired by a physical weakness, by which the
adviser receives any advantage in the transaction between
them, will be set aside as being -contrary to the principles
of equity, whether the benefit accrues to the spiritual
advisers or to some other person who may have become
the beneficiary through such influence.
Corp. of Latter Day Saints v. Watson, 25 U. 45
syl. 3; 69 P. 531.
California cases which reSpondents quote upon the suf·
ficiency of the consideration, refer to an earlier California
case of Parsons v. Cashman et al, 137 P. 1109 which is en·
lightening:
_''The sufficiency of a purported or claimed consideration
for a contract of the character. under discussion must be
determined from the facts of the transaction as they existed when the contract was made, rather than by subsequent developments. Such consideration, before it may
be declared sufficient, must disclose not only a benefit
• conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor,
but must reveal as well some prejudice, detriment, or
disadvantage suffered or agreed to be suffered by the
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The court then discusses the evidence, and points out
that neither the contract nor the circumstances, expressly or
impliedly, shmvs the promise of the diseased operated as an
inducement to the plaintiff to relinquish, wholly or partly,
anything of present or prospective value or advantage; and
that in making the contract, nothing of value was abandoned, and that the obligation assumed by the plaintiff did not
require him to abandon any particular position of present
or prospective profit. Here was something to gain insteail
of something to lose.
The same is true of the facts in the case at bar. The
plaintiffs did not change their position in any way; the_y
rendered no care or attention after the purported contract
which they had not rendered before ; and they did not sign
any writing or obligation by which any person could hold
them to pay any obligations. The evidence shows they paid
nothing.
After searching the authorities, no case has been found
which upheld such a purported consideration.
In the cases cited by the respondents, there were writings marking the obligations of the persons receiving the
property, made after careful and full advice when the owner
of the property was well; and many independent witnesses
appared and substantiated the fairness and independent advice of the persons parting with the property. In the Johnson
v. Studley case, 252 P. 638, Studley gave up the gainful occupation of a carpenter; and he and his wife took Bentson
into their home and properly and carefully cared for him until he died. Such is shown by the many cases cited and ref··
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such elements are present which are not here present. The
case of Long Beach Drug Co. v. United Drug Co., 88 P. -(2d)
698, deals with the enforcement of a business sales contract,
and does not approach the personal relations contract or
case as does this cause.
We call the court's attention to the failure of the respondents to meet the argument that a widow and minor children
of a decedent are his creditors under the law; that the transfers claimed to be valid by the respondents, in such event, -left
Wilmer Webb insolvent and unable to care for or maintain his
family; and that the reasonable value of that support and
maintenance would, up to date of this appeal, be more than
$1500.00. Finding "4", to which no exception was taken, is
that Wilmer took the three minor children into his home,
and they were supported by him and Mrs. Webb jointly.
''Where on stands in loco parentis to another, the
rights and liabilities arising out of that relation are, as
the words imply, exactly the same as between parent and
child. 1 '
Sparks v. Hinckley, 78 U. 502 at p. 506; 5. P (2d) 570.

ADMINSTRATRIX'S RIGHT TO AN ACCOUNTING
Plaintiffs fail to point out or refe,.. to any evidence under
which they claim "all Wilmer's property". They fail to
poin_t out or refer to any evidence to support such a claim.
They fail to point out or refer to any purported settlement
or accounting at the dissolution of the partnership, or at any
time, or at all. There is no substantial evidence in the record
to sustain such claims, or any of them. Wilmer Webb had
a right
an Law
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2L
him, or claimed to have been made to him.
has been made to his administratrix.

No accounting

\Ve deny that the record shows: ''that Wilmer, with
Margaret 1S full knowledge and consent, was turning all of
his property to the plaintiffs in consideration of maintenance
and support of Wilmer and the payment of his outstanding
hospital, doctor and other indebtedness.'' we deny the record
shows a purported transfer to the plaintiffs of title to Wilmer's car, his bonds, his water certificates, his hand tools,
his personal belongings, and partnership animals, or any of
them. We deny the record shows the consent of Margaret
Webb to the transfer to the plaintiffs of any personal property of Wilmer Webb, or even any knowledge thereof, until
after his death. We deny it shows o consent of Margaret
Webb to the transfer of Wilber Webb's real estate on the
basis claimed by the plaintiffs.
The bill of sale purports to transfer ''all other livestock
owned by me or in which I have an interest," whatever said
disjunctive clauses mean. No reference is. therein made to
partnership animals. We maintain as heretofore argued,· that
the great prepondernce of evidence shows no such agreement, no consideration for such claimed agreement,- and no
evidence of the transfer of "all the property" of Wilmer, and
no transfer of his rights to such property.
Respondents are mistaken that the record is silent as to
how the stipulation to which they refer was reached. The
record on that is as follows:
''Udell R. Jensen, Attorney for defendant herein came
before the court and objected to certain recitals in profindings
submitted
by pJ,aintiffs
herein.
Therupon
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plaintiff and defendant, making certain changes in said
proposed findings and decree." (R. 360-361).
The announced decision of the court and the proposed
findings of the cour-t compl·etely omitted four items on which
no dispute existed. Counsel for the plaintiffs admitted several
items were established in favor of de~dants, and stipulated
as to them, but no others. Said items were:
FIRST: Paragraphs 11 and 13 of their reply admit that
Wilmer Webb was the owner of the guns and a pair of field
glasses (R. 28).
SECOND: That on or about June 1, 1946, Spencer Webb
received from the Oasis Seed Plant, Farmers' Cooperative
$422.91 belonging to the partnership of Webb Bros., consisting of Wilmer Webb and the plaintiffs, which the plaintiffs
appropriated to themselves (Ex. BB and tr. 235-6). It was
this item on which the parties stipulated the administratrix
was entitled to $141.00, approximately one-third thereof.
THIRD: That the plaintiff, J. M. Webb, on crossexamination testified.
'' Q.

You think there IS owing some money, owing tu
to the administratrix from the partnership of Webb

Brothers ? ''
"A. Yes."
''Q. How much?''
"A. About $90."
(tr. 157)
This was for the pellets and is the $90 covered in the stipulation- ( tr. 157).
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on the barn ( tr. 50). And off the record, it was conceded
they took the grain which was Wilmer Webbs, as far as we
can determine. The $90 is for the value of his grain.
Vvre deny that the stipulation was intended to cover
"whatever assets might be due the administratrix of Wilmer
Webb's estate". There is nothing in the stipulation to so
shmv. The record establishes defendants were entitled to
judgment for other items which were not conceded by the
plaintiffs, not covered by the stiuplation, and on which no
accounting was made.
Independent of the accounting which is due under the
mortgage, and situation when the deed and bill of sale art!
set aside, the record shows an accounting is due from the
partnership to the administratrix on the following:
(1) The status of the moneys received and expended
by J. M. Webb and Spencer Webb for the partnership over
three years prior to, and at the time of, dissolution of thl'
partnership; and the accounts kept by them

(2) The $445.57 which the plaintiffs took for themselves
from the partnership funds on March 14, 1946 (last check
Ex. "U"; tr. 227, 249-50).
(3) The shortages of $1923.72 from moneys of the partnership received by the plaintiffs from sale of seed between
April 13, 1944, and February 7, 1946. (Ex. "DD", ''H", and

"I"; A. br. p. 62-3).
( 4) The disposition and ownership of the 120 head 9£
catde assessed to "Webb Bros." by the County Assessor ou
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was completely a "hedge" and unsatisfactory
157-67).

( tr. 115-18.

( 5) All of the hay and feed the partnership raised during
the cropping season of 1945 which plaintiffs admitted to he
partnership feed, but claim was fed to their cattle ( tr.l57-67).

CONCLUSIONS
Accordingly. we submit the views set out in our brief
on appeal should be adopted.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of February, A. D.
1949.

JENSEN & JENSEN
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants

Reveiced copy this
1949.

day of

February, A .D.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Respondents
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